Standardization News

You don’t have to be a news buff to know that incidents of violence in public spaces worldwide have become more prevalent. According to a report from the nonpartisan Rockefeller Institute of Government, from 1966 through 2022, 441 mass shootings took place in the United States alone, with 170 occurring from 2013 to 2022. The Rockefeller Institute defines a mass shooting as “an incident of targeted violence carried out by one or more shooters at one or more public or populated locations. Multiple victims (both injuries and fatalities) are associated with the attack.” 

ASTM International’s committee on security systems and equipment (F12) is working to make the public less vulnerable to threats. Formed in 1972, the committee currently has 40 standards devoted to terminology; test methods; performance specifications; classifications and practices for security systems; components and equipment for security of property and life; and product counterfeit protection. 

“Our committee answers the question: ‘If you try a new product or system approach, how do you test it appropriately?,’” says committee member and former chair Ed Conrath. “F12 has an approach that’s consistent across the spectrum of testing.”

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The committee’s chair, Julia Schimmelpennigh, says, “The committee thinks of security in a unique way: How is it affecting our environment, our lifestyle, and everyone’s personal safety? We’ve all seen things that, unfortunately, we don’t need to see, and we’re working to make our world safer.”

Active Shooters and Forced-Entry Testing

One standard devoted to making the world safer is the test method for forced-entry resistance of fenestration systems after simulated active shooter attack (F3561). It covers situations where an active shooter attempts to enter a facility such as a school, commercial, residential, or government building. The test method simulates an active shooter weakening the fenestration system, which is defined as “all openings in the building envelope, including curtain walls, windows, doors, and skylights,” according to New York Engineers. The test involves weakening the system first with repetitive shots and then with a mechanically driven impact to the system. The F12 standard allows manufacturers to test and rate their windows, doors, modular panels, glazing, and similar products to ensure that they meet the requirements for forced-entry protection after an active shooter event.

“Because we use laminated glass in the test method, it forces the aggressor not only to shoot but also to break through the remainder of the system, which causes a little more delay,” says Conrath, who is a protection engineering consultant.

After the initial shot strikes a fenestration system, there are several ways to break through it, whether by kicking, punching, striking the glass with the butt of the gun, or continuing to shoot at the glass until it shatters completely. At that point, the assailant would be able to walk through the opening and enter the facility.

“The approach affords some security and slows the aggressor down, perhaps frustrating them enough that they go away,” Conrath says. “We’re keeping the individual from the objective, which is on the inside of the school.”

Schimmelpennigh notes that before drafting the standard, members of the subcommittee on systems products and services (F12.10) looked at Consumer Product Safety Commission requirements, human impact safety, and existing ASTM standards. These standards included the standard test method for timed evaluation of forced-entry-resistant systems (F3038); the standard test method for glazing and glazing systems subject to air-blast loadings (F1642); and the standard test methods for glazing for detention facilities (F1915). The latter was published by the committee on detention and correctional facilities (F33).

“In looking at these standards, the committee identified gaps in performance and areas that needed modification to write a standard capable of mitigating the type of attack we were addressing, yet still make it easy to reference in specifications,” Schimmelpennigh says.

Written as a deterrent standard, F3561 is not intended to be used for ballistic-resistant glazing ratings. The standard test method for ballistic-resistant security glazing materials (F3279) handles glazing ratings. Glazing tested with the methods outlined in F3279 can be assigned a ballistic-resistant class (BRC) criterion and a ballistic test identity (BTI).

“We have always had very substantial bullet-resistant standards,” says Schimmelpennigh, who is a global architectural applications manager at Eastman Chemical Company. “In F3279, you are trying to create a bullet-resistant glazing material, and in testing, the bullets cannot go through the glazing.”

Many different weapons, ammunitions, and velocities are covered by this standard. However, with F3561, Schimmelpennigh says that the subcommittee looked at the weapon most often used in school shootings, the AR-15. One of the most ubiquitous guns in the U.S., an AR-15 is a lightweight, easy-to-discharge, semi-automatic rifle.

Vehicle Security Barriers

Because not all threats to security come from active shooters, the committee also addresses the possibility of vehicles ramming buildings, public gatherings, and other vehicles. Updated in 2023, the standard test method for crash testing of vehicle security barriers (F2656) provides a way to identify a penetration rating for vehicle perimeter barriers subjected to a vehicle impact. The standard does not make these barriers invulnerable to penetration.

“The original standard for this was held by the U.S. State Department. The State Department didn’t want to be in the business of standards, so ASTM took it over. We broadened the scope quite a bit, adding passenger cars, pick-ups, and European cab-over trucks to the original single-unit truck, which is like a U-Haul truck,” Dean Alberson says.

He adds that the two main users of this standard are the U.S. State Department and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Alberson is a research engineer and the principal author of the standard.

The test method applies to active security barriers such as retractable bollards, sliding gates, and wedges – all of which can be deployed and then stowed – and passive barriers, such as permanent bollards. It features a range of vehicle impact conditions and penetration performance levels.

Effective screening can thwart an assailant before they reach the target.

The resulting barrier-penetration rating does not guarantee that a barrier will perform the same way under different site conditions. A site’s soil type, slope, and other topographical features may alter the barrier’s response to an impact. In some cases, this could be a positive change, such as when the topography, or adjustment of it, enhances the barrier’s performance or slows or changes the approach of a vehicle. As an example, Alberson cites digging a hole in front of a wall or other barrier so that, when a vehicle approaches, the front of the vehicle drops into that hole.

Related to F2656 is the standard test method for surrogate testing of vehicle impact protective devices at low speeds (F3016). This test method establishes a penetration rating for barriers subject to low-speed impacts. Among the types of barriers benefitting from F3016 are small bollards, benches, ruggedized trash cans, and anti-ram planters, which are often found in urban settings.

Securing Against Water-Side Strikes

Threats don’t exist exclusively on land. Onshore port facilities, offshore facilities, and floating assets such as boats can fall victim to sieges, too. The U.S.S. Cole destroyer serves as a grim reminder of what a small boat loaded with explosives can do. The explosion, which occurred in Yemen’s Aden harbor in October 2000, tore a 40-foot-wide hole in the U.S.S. Cole, killed seventeen U.S. sailors, and injured 37 others. More recently, in October 2023, Yemeni Houthi rebels began deploying bomb-filled boats, as well as missiles and aerial drones, to attack international cargo ships and oil tankers in the Red Sea.

To advance the protection of seafaring vessels, the committee created the standard test method for boat barriers (F2766). It tests and evaluates the stopping capabilities of boat barriers at the point of impact and the moments prior to the impact of a small surface motor boat. Along with establishing an impact rating, the test method requires the determination and reporting of the maximum deformation of the barrier during testing. This information aids in the selection of appropriate barriers.

The test method does not apply to floating lines of demarcation – interconnected floats that indicate a line of separation for sensitive areas such as shipyards, dams, water reservoirs, power plants, and industrial facilities. The standard is meant for surface and sub-surface barriers that can stop a “boat or small surface motor boat,” as stated in the standard.  

Withstanding Blasts

Security systems must be able to withstand, to some degree, an explosion. The standard practice for blast testing (F3664) sets up a customary practice for blast tests of physical security products, related devices, and systems. Windows and doors, which may also have bullet-resistance ratings, are among the products covered by it.

By standardizing blast-test methodology and the interpretation and documentation of blast-test results, the committee aims to maximize the consistency and repeatability of blast tests. 

“In the past, when people did blast testing, there were questions about the approach used to obtain their results. From this standard, we can start getting apples to apples,” Conrath says.

He explains that, at the start of a blast test, the charge is placed on a pad to prevent the crater ejector from coming out and influencing the test; only the shock wave and shock front from the explosive, not the debris, are measured. Test reports include how the explosive is detonated and how it’s instrumented through pressure gauges, high-speed photography, and more.

Seen as a starting point for a future international standard on the best practice for blast testing, F3664 is expected to evolve as changes occur in requirements and facility capabilities.

Screening Increases Safety

In certain instances, an attack can be thwarted before an assailant even nears the planned target. Hand-held, hand-worn, and walk-through metal detectors (WTMDs) allow security workers to identify weapons and metal contraband, leading to the disarming and detention of would-be attackers. The detectors are common sights at airports, courthouses, military bases, schools, correctional facilities, and event venues.

ASTM’s subcommittee on controlled access security, search, and screening equipment (F12.60) has several standards supporting these detection devices, including the standard performance specifications and test methods for hand-worn metal detectors (F3020); hand-held metal detectors (F3278); and walk-through metal detectors (F3566). Comprehensive in nature, the standards include the design of the test objects.

“With F3566, you look for the worst-case scenario – where the alarm occurs within the portal of the WTMD,” says Nick Paulter, chair of F12.60 and group leader at the National Institute of Standards and Technology. “We’d like to modify F3566 so that it also incorporates the sensitivity mapping of C1270 [standard practice for detection sensitivity mapping of in-plant walk-through metal detectors], where you look at the detection sensitivity of the WTMD in a grid pattern of the portal area, creating a density plot in some sense, and collecting and recording that data.” Paulter adds that, while F3566 does collect and map detection sensitivity data, unlike C1270, it does so only temporarily, for the purpose of alarm recording.

Used globally, the standard practice for evaluating the imaging performance of security x-ray systems (F792) applies to cabinet x-ray systems. Originally based on human perception to qualify an image, the standard has been updated not only to reflect changes in technology but also to add different test objects and objective performance test metrics.

“With human perception, you and I can look at the same image and have different responses to the content of that image, specifically, as to whether a threat or target was shown in the image,” Paulter says. “We then make a decision regarding the ability of the imaging system to provide images of sufficient quality to perform our perception task of threat detection. I can also look at the same image on a different day and not see what I saw earlier.”

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“We would like to know if the imaging system provides images of sufficient quality for a human to perform their perception-based task. Using objective imaging metrics, you can algorithmically determine whether the image is of sufficient quality, which is a good change for security imaging systems standards.”

Making Security Standards Work

In many circumstances, a facility may require more than one type of security system to safeguard its occupants. Cameras can capture, but can’t necessarily stop, an offense in progress. Likewise, even if multiple security measures are in place, the equipment and systems must be in working order and their protocols followed. Getting into the habit of following the simplest of security measures is critical.

“Both physical and visual security play a role,” Schimmelpenningh says. “ A school or office building may monitor its video cameras 24/7, but that doesn’t help if someone can just break the glass and get inside, or if your doors and windows aren’t locked and someone can walk right in. No one can guarantee a system tested to a standard or any security system will always work, as the threats can evolve, but unless you can guarantee that you’re locking those doors, it doesn’t matter.”

As with all standards, adoption is key. In the case of schools, towns, and municipalities are the entities that choose to embrace security systems and equipment standards.

“You’ve got this incredible piece of documentation to help protect people, and even if they just referenced level one, it’s much more protection than they typically have today,” Schimmelpennigh says.

For additional information about or to join the committee on security systems and equipment (F12), please contact staff manager Frank McConnell at fmcconnell@astm.org. ■  

Kathy Hunt is a U.S. East Coast-based journalist.